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ARTICLE
LLOYD V. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION: AN
UNFORTUNATE DETOUR IN MARYLAND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW
By: Rebecca Korzec"

1. INTRODUCTION

In products liability cases, the injured plaintiff must demonstrate
the necessary causal connection between the defective product and the
plaintiffs injuries. l Nevertheless, in some limited cases, plaintiffs
allege an increased risk of harm for the future, rather than any actual
present, injury.2 Often these cases involve asbestos and prescription
drugs. 3
Of particular interest are cases in which the plaintiff claims "purely
economic 10ss.,,4 Pure economic loss damages are "damages for
inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective
product, or consequent loss of profits - without any claim of personal
injury or damage to other property."s The justification for the
economic loss doctrine is that the plaintiff who has received
"insufficient product value,,6 should sue in contract/ rather than tort. 8

2

4

Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108, 132-33, 916 A.2d 257, 271 (2007)
(hereinafter "Lloyd") (citing Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 341,
363 A.2d 955,957 (1976».
See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent
Diseases Resulting/rom Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REv. 613 (2005).
[d. at 653-54.
See, e.g., Progressive Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ind.
2001) ("[E]conomic damages [are defined] under Indiana Law as the diminution
in the value of a product and consequent loss of profits because the product is
inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was
manufactured and sold.").
Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
917,918 (1966).
Oceanside at Pine Point Condo. Owners Ass'n. v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659
A.2d 267, 270 (Me. 1995).
See, e.g., Reed v. Cent. Soya Co., 621 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75 (Ind. 1993).
See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965); see also,
Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264,270-71 (N.J. 1997) (reviewing
majority cases).
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In Lloyd v. General Motors Corp., the Court of Appeals of Maryland
rejected the majority rule in American products liability law by
holding that unmanifested product defects, defects that have not
caused personal injury, can still be actionable. 9 The court reinstated a
class action brought by plaintiff buyers against automobile
manufacturers who sold cars alleged to contain defective seatbacks. lo
The seatbacks had yet to cause any actual injuries to the plaintiff class
members, as the alleged defects had not even manifested themselves. II
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reasoned that, since
the alleged defects could potentially cause serious injury or death, the
cost of repairing the seatbacks was actionable in consumer protection,
in contract, and in tort. 12
In this article, I argue that Lloyd is an unfortunate, unwarranted,
and unnecessary extension of tort law. Assuming arguendo that the
seatbacks were defective, plaintiffs had adequate remedies in
consumer protection and contract. 13 By recognizing a products
liability tort remedy in this situation, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland is in conflict with Maryland precedent,14 with the majority
of American jurisdictions, I 5 and with the underlying goals and
rationales of products liability law. As such, Lloyd is a departure in
both theory and practice.
II. THE CASE
The Lloyd plaintiffs brought suit against General Motors, Ford
Motors, Daimler Chrysler, and Saturn, alleging that the front seats of
cars they had purchased would collapse backwards in rear-impact
collisions. 16 Plaintiffs alleged that these seat defects could potentially
cause serious injury or death.17 Although the seatbacks had yet to fail,
the plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and other Maryland

9
10

II
12

13

14

15

16
17

397 Md. 108,916 A.2d 257 (2007).
Id. at 171,916 A.2d at 294.
Id. at 117-18, 916 A.2d at 262.
Id. at 171, 916 A.2d at 293-94.
See id. at 157, 916 A.2d at 285-86. The court itself recognizes these claims
under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. Lloyd, 397 Md. at 140-43, 916

A.2d 276-78.
See infra section IV.
See infra section III.
Lloyd, 397 Md. at 117-18,916 A.2d at 262.
Id. at 118,916 A.2d at 262.
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resident purchasers of the cars, seeking damages for the cost of
repairing or replacing the seatbacks.!8
The Court of Appeals of Maryland admitted that a plaintiff in a
products liability case generally may not recover for pure economic
damages.!9 Nevertheless, the court recognized an exception to the
economic damage rule when the product defect creates a "substantial
and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury.,,2o The court found
that Lloyd fit within the stated exception, given the nature of the
potential damage and the probability of its occurrence?! Significantly,
the court stated, "it is exactly the risk of serious bodily injury involved
in this case that the exception to the economic loss rule was intended
to remedy, to 'encourafe people to correct dangerous conditions
before tragedy results. ,,,2
The Lloyd opinion is clearly a minority view. 23 Most American
courts require plaintiffs in a products liability claim to allege a present
injury.24
For example, the Eighth Circuit has observed that,
"purchasers of an allegedly defective product have no legally
recognizable claim where the alleged defect has not manifested itself
in the product they own." 25 "An overwhelming majority of courts
have dismissed these unrnanifested defect claims and rejected the idea
that [plaintiffs] can sue manufacturers for speculative damage.,,26
A major problem with the Lloyd analysis is that it gives a tort
remedy for a contract claim.27 Basically, the only injury to the
plaintiffs is that they may not have received the benefit of their bargain
18

19

20

21
22

23

24

25
26

27

Id. at 117-18, 916 A.2d at 262 ("None of the petitioners or any putative class
members allege . . . personal injury as a result of the mechanical failure that
caused the aIleged defect. Indeed, persons with such experiences were
expressly excluded from this class.") /d. at 118,916 A.2d at 262.
/d. at 123,916 A.2d at 265-66.
Id. at 123, 916 A.2d at 266 (quoting U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of BaIt., 336
Md. 145, 156-57,647 A.2d405, 410 (1994».
Id. at 130,916 A.2d at 270.
/d. at 131,916 A.2d at 270 (quoting Morris v. Osmose, 340 Md. 519, 534-35,
667 A.2d 624, 632 (1995)).
See id. at 123,916 A.2d at 266; see also DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW 272 & n.82 (West 2005). Ohio and Florida are also in the minority. See
LaPuma v. Collinwood Concrete, 661 N.E.2d 714 (Ohio 1996); Collins v.
Daimler Chrysler Corp., 894 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
See, e.g., Briehl v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted).
Id.
/d. at 630.
Lloyd, 397 Md. at 123,916 A.2d at 265.
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if they did not receive the car seats for which they paid?8 However,
"benefit of the bargain" is the essence of a contract claim. 29 To
maintain a products liability claim, plaintiffs must prove that they
were injured by a product defect that was unreasonably dangerous to
the ultimate product user. 30
Lloyd seems willing to recognize an exception for buyers who are
merely disappointed in a contractual sense. 31 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland considered the plaintiffs in Lloyd to be in danger of
suffering potential harm which required immediate tort
compensation. 32 Therefore, Maryland becomes one of the few states
to permit an exception to the economic loss doctrine based on
distinguishing the disap~ointed product buyer from the potentially
endangered product user. 3

III. THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
The widely-accepted eC0nomic loss doctrine generally prohibits
recovery in tort for purely economic losses which arise independent
from damage to persons or property.34 The rule is so generally
accepted that comprehensive products liability reform efforts usually
exclude recovery for economic loss and property damage. 35
Moreover, section 21 of the Products Liability Restatement permits
recovery for economic loss only "if caused by harm to: (a) the
28
29
30

31
32

33

34

35

Id. at 149,916 A.2d at 281.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1979).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Phipps v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
See Lloyd, 397 Md. at 131,916 A.2d at 270.
See id. at 134,916 A.2d at 272.
Other states that adopted the minority view are Alaska, Georgia, and Iowa. See
N. Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska
1981); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 306 S.E.2d 253,257 (Ga. 1983);
Am. Fire and Cas. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 588 N.W.2d 437,438 (Iowa 1999).
See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9A, 681 (5th ed. 1984)
(noting that parties who have bargained should not be permitted to circumvent
their bargain after loss occurs to the property that was the subject of their
bargain); see generally David Gruning, Pure Economic Loss in American Tort
Law: An Unstable Consensus, 54 AM. 1. COMPo L. (SUPPLEMENT) 187 (2006); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, U.C.C. § 10-5 (5th ed. 2000) (generally endorsing the
idea that pure economic losses should not be recovered in tort).
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-687 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m
(2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-l (West 2000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2307.71 (LexisNexis 2006).

2008]

Maryland Products Liability

131

plaintiff's person; or (b) the person of another ... or (c) the plaintiff's
property other than the defective product itself.,,36
The controlling law in this area is an admiralty case decided by the
United States Supreme Court: East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc. 37 East River is a strict liability and
negligence case brought by the charterers of four ships against the
manufacturer of turbines installed in those ships.38 Plaintiffs alleged
that the turbines were defectively designed, causing damage to the
turbines themselves. 39 Plaintiffs sought damages for the cost of
repairing the turbines, as well as lost income while the ships were not
in service. 4o Applying products liability concepts, the Court
unanimously held "that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship
has no duty under either a negligence or strict products liability theory
to prevent a product from injuring itself.,,41
The Court considered three approaches for determining whether an
action can be brought in tort for damage only to the product itself.
Significantly, the Court rejected the intermediate view, noting that a
distinction which rests on the manner in which the product is damaged
is not persuasive. 42 Whether the product itself is damaged by gradual
deterioration, internal breakage, or by a calamitous event should not be
dispositive. 43 By definition, no other property or person is damaged. 44
Economic loss resulting from a calamitous event simply means that
the buyer failed to receive the benefit of the bargain, a matter
traditionally within the province of contract law, rather than tort law. 45
Moreover, the Court rejected the minority approach for failing to
maintain contract and tort law in separate spheres. 46 Such separation
results in more appropriate, realistic damages. 47 In adopting the
majority approach to pure economic loss, the Court stressed a number
of doctrinal concepts.
36
37

38

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998).
476 U.S. 858 (1986) (holding that admiralty law incorporates principles of
products liability law.)
/d. at 861.

42

/d.
/d.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 870.

43

E. River Steamship Corp. (hereinafter "E. River"), 476 U.S. at 870.

44

Id.
Id.

39
40
41

45
46

47

See id. at 87l.
See id. at 872.
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First, appropriate tort safety concerns are minimized where the
defective product damages only itself. Therefore, a defective product
that does not damage any person or other property simply fails to meet
the burer's reasonable expectations, which constitutes a warranty
claim. 4
In the main, warranty doctrine is suited to commercial
disputes not involving significant disparities in bargaining power. 49
Warranty law has inherent limitations on liability, while tort law
recognizes a duty to the general public, permitting recovery for
foreseeable losses. 50 As a result, tort recovery could subject product
manufacturers to indefinite economic losses to a buyer's customers. 51
Therefore, warranty law provides a bright line for damages to the
product itself, avoiding the needless uncertainty inherent in any
attempt to limit pure economic losses in negligence and strict liability.
Clearly, the United States Supreme Court recognized the differing
legitimate interests protected by contract law as opposed to tort law.
Contractual liability stems from society's interest in performing
promises so that contracting parties' reasonable expectations are
protected. 52 By contrast, tort doctrine protects the product user's
interest in being free from product harm, regardless of the existence of
a contract between the ultimate user and the product manufacturer or
seller. 53 Products liability law recognizes that users and sellers of
products, especially consumer products, enjoy unequal bargaining
positions. 54 As a result, the law must provide protection to the public
from unsafe products. 55
Products liability tort law places
responsibility on the manufacturers of defective products because they
are in the best position to design, manufacture, and market safe
products, as well as to allocate losses for injuries resulting from unsafe
products. 56 On the other hand, repair costs are based on the buyer's
loss of the benefit of the contractual bargain -- a loss which should be

48
49
50
51

52
53
54

55
56

Id. at 871-72.
E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-73.
/d. at 874.
/d. at 872 ("[T]he increased cost to the public that would result from holding a
manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified."). Id.
See id. at 872-74.
See id.
See id.
E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-74.
Id. at 871.
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compensated in contract rather than tort. 57 In East River, the Court
explained the doctrines as follows: "Damage to a product itself is
most naturally understood as a warranty claim. Such damage means
simply that the product has not met the customer's expectations, or, in
other words, that the customer has received 'insufficient product
value. ",58
Some courts have found an exception for actions against
manufacturers of asbestos products, permitting tort claims for the costs
of removing asbestos insulation. 59 Asbestos' characteristic flexibility,
strength, and heat resistance led to its use in insulation and related
products until the 1970s. 6o Its pervasive use led to millions of
individuals' exposure to asbestos dUSt. 61 Inhalation of asbestos causes
major diseases, including lung cancer, mesothelioma and asbestosis. 62
The asbestos cases present a situation in which the very exposure to
the product causes physical harm, although the extent of the harm may
not become apparent for decades. 63 Maryland asbestos cases have
required the plaintiff to suffer "functional impairment" to maintain a
strict liability action. 64 Such "functional impairment" requires the
plaintiff to experience symptoms, such as shortness of breath, which
curtail normal activities. 65 The rationale in these cases is that the
57

58

59

60
61

62

63

64

65

/d. at 872; see also V.C.c. § 2-313 (2004) (express warranty); V.C.C. § 2-314
(2004) (implied warranty of merchantability); V.C.C. § 2-315 (2004) (implied
warranty of fitness for particular purpose).
E. River, 476 V.S. at 872.
See, e.g., Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. V.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915,91920 (8th Cir. 1993); 80 South Eighth St. Ltd. P'ship v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486
N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1992). The Restatement (Third) of Torts, section 21
comment e, provides that: "One category of claims stands apart. In the case of
asbestos contamination in buildings, most courts have taken the position that the
contamination constitutes harm to the building as other property. The serious
health threat caused by asbestos contamination has led the courts to this
conclusion. Thus, actions seeking recovery for the costs of asbestos removal
have been held to be within the purview of products liability law rather than
commercial law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e
(1998).
See, e.g., Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
/d. at 323-24.
/d. at 324.
See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir.
1973).
See generally Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 121-22, 604
A.2d 47,54 (1992).
Cf ACandS v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 693, 710 A.2d 944, 995 (1998)
(discussing shortness of breath related to asbestos related injuries).
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property owners were not suing for the contractual benefit of their
bargain. Instead, the property owners were seeking to recover the cost
of removing asbestos since asbestos exposure itself risks the health of
those exposed to it. 66 As a result, these courts conclude that the
economic loss doctrine should not bar tort recovery in such limited
circumstances. 67
Courts justify recovery for damage to property other than the
product itself.68 The prevailing view permits recovery for such
damage in both warranty and in tort. 69 For example, the United States
Supreme Court held that the owner of a fishing vessel could recover
damages for the loss of equipment added by the previous owner of the
vessel after purchase from the manufacturer. 7o In that case, the vessel
caught fire and sank, causing the owner to bring a products liability
action against the manufacturer of the vessel and arainst the designer
of the hydraulic system, alleging defective design.7 The Court found
that the added equipment constituted "other property" rather than harm
to the "product itself."n
Maryland law is in accord with these general principles. For
example, in a case decided before the Saratoga Fishing Co. opinion,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland permitted recovery for the loss of
140,000 chickens that died as a result of a power outage that caused
the ventilation system in the chicken house to shut down. 73 The
defendant's transfer switch caused the power outage, by failing to
activate the backup power supply.74

66

67

68
69
70
71

72

73

74

See generally Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for Asbestos Removal Costs,
73 OR. L. REv. 505 (1994). The Restatement adopts the East River approach,
but recognizes that products that are dangerous to users are generally governed
by products liability tort rules rather than contract. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PROD. LIAS. § 21 cmt. d (1998).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAS. § 21 cmt. d.
[d. § 21 cmt. e.
[d.; see also U.C.C. § 2-715 (2003).
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. I.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877 (1997).
[d. at 877.
!d.
A.1. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 634 A.2d 1330
(1994). As a result, the "other property requirement" was met in that the
chickens were lost, causing the plaintiff economic loss to property other than the
defective equipment. Simply put, the defective product caused the plaintiff to
lose more than his contractual bargain -- it also harmed other property.
[d. at 247, 634 A.2d at 1331.
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Thus, the significant question is the definition of "other property."
For example, in a 2005 Indiana case, Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc.,
homeowners brought a negligence claim against a masonry contractor
who installed a stone fa~ade on their home, seeking to recover
damages for repair costs and lost use of the home due to severe
moisture damage. 75 The court permitted tort recovery on the theory
that the homeowner had purchased the masonry fa~ade, not the
house. 76 As a result, tort recovery for damage to the home was not
limited by the economic loss doctrine. 77
Moreover, most courts disagree with the Lloyd court's conclusion
that a mere possibility that a product defect may cause physical harm
is sufficient justification for abrogating the economic loss rule. 78
Rejecting the economic loss doctrine completely ignores the basic
principle that injury must occur before a tort action may be brought. 79
If an injury has not occurred, causation and victim identity remain
completely speculative. As a result, potential manufacturer liability is
indeterminate, with no possibility that damages will be reasonably
related to risk, and with no possibility that the product manufacturer
can plan to protect against that risk. 80
As previously discussed, in East River and Saratoga Fishing Co.,
the United States Supreme Court embraced the economic loss rule,
making it more difficult for parties to move from contract to tort in
products liability cases. 81 Simply put, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized, along with the majority of courts and the
Products Liability Restatement, that pure economic loss to the product
itself should be governed by contract law. 82
75

76
77
78

79

80

81

82

822 N.E.2d 150,151 (Ind. 2005).
Id. at 156.
Id. at 156-57.
See, e.g., Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244 (Fla. 1993).
Id; see a/so Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114
HARV. L. REv. 961, 1101 (2001) (noting reluctance to impose liability on
fairness grounds when it cannot be proved that injurer caused harm to victim).
E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica De/ava/, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874
(1986).
See supra section III.
"[T]ort law is a superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely commercial
disputes. We have a body of law designed for such disputes. It is called
contract law. Products liability law has evolved into a specialized branch of tort
law for use in cases in which a defective product caused, not the usual
commercial loss, but a personal injury to a consumer or bystander." Miller v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Tort and contract law treat damages for defective goods which have
not yet caused physical injury differently. Physical injury is not
required for warranty damage recovery - economic damages for
disappointment in the product's performance are sufficient. 83
However, physical harm is required for recovery of tort damages. 84
Ignoring the difference between tort and contract theory creates
confusion and hinders the development of coherent policy.
Lloyd seems inconsistent with previous Maryland case law. In
addition, this view is supported by the Fourth Circuit's interpretations
of Maryland law. For example, in Hagepanos v. Shiley, Inc.,85 the
plaintiff received a heart valve implant in 1982, a date when the
manufacturer stated the failure rate to be one in ten thousand. 86 Six
years later, the failure rate estimates became between one in one
hundred and one in ten. 87 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's dismissal, because to recover "future damages" in Maryland, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the occurrence of the damages is more
probable than not, meaning more than fifty of one hundred valves
would fail. 88 Significantly, the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs
argument that he should recover "present" damages for his "present
fear.,,89 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit stated that recovery for
"present fear" would frustrate Ma~land law since many plaintiffs
could claim distress about the future. 0

IV. MARYLAND ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
Maryland law specifically requires that, "compensatory damages
are not to be awarded in negligence or strict liability actions absent

83

84

85

86

87

88

89
90

u.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2004) ("The measure of damages for breach of warranty is
the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted
.... ").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) ("Physical harm thereby
caused .... "); see also id. § 402A cmt. c.
No. 87-314, 1988 WL 35752 (4th Cir. Apr. 18, 1988) (unpublished table
decision).
/d. at *1.
/d.
Id. (citing Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 666, 464 A.2d
1020, 1026 (1983); Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 62, 344 A.2d 422,427-28
(1975».
Id.
Id.
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evidence that the plaintiff suffered a loss or detriment.,,91 Generally,
Maryland does not permit recovery in tort for pure economic loss
resulting from a product defect unless that defect causes a condition
which creates a significant risk of death or personal injury.92 To
circumvent this rule, thereby allowing recovery in tort for pure
economic losses, Maryland cases consider both the nature of the
threatened damage and the probability that the damage will OCCUr. 93
Ultimately, Maryland cases permit recovery for pure economic loss in
tort only when the defective product exhibits clear, serious, and
unreasonable risk of death or personal injury.94
As a result, if the potential injury is extremely severe, such as the
occurrence of multiple deaths, the probability of injury is not required
to be as significant as when the potential injury is less dangerous. 95
Absent such a significantly dangerous condition, a buyer is limited to
contractual recovery, including recovery for breach of express and
implied warranties. 96 Generally, contractual remedies offer more
limited damages than tort money damages. 97 In an appropriate tort
case, punitive damages are also available. 98

91
92

93
94

9S
96

97

98

Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 735, 591 A.2d 544, 561 (1991).
See, e.g., Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 536, 667 A.2d 624,
633 (1995) (holding that because plaintiff homeowners failed to prove that
defects in plywood used to construct roofs on their homes caused any injury or
created a serious, unreasonable risk of death or personal injury, the plaintiffs
were barred from recovery in tort by economic loss doctrine).
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 251, 634
A.2d 1330, 1332 (1994); Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo., Inc. v.
Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 40-41, 517 A.2d 336, 348 (1986).
See supra note 65.
See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Bait., 336 Md. 145, 156,647 A.2d 405,
410 (1994); A.J. Decoster Co., 333 Md. at 250, 634 A.2d at 1332.
Tort damages may include punitive damages and recovery of attorneys fees
generally not recoverable in contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
(1978); see, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND
COMPENSATION 759 (West 1997).
ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 186, 686 A.2d 250, 265 (1996); Owens
Coming v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 532-33, 726 A.2d 745, 784 (1999)
(holding that a plaintiff must prove two elements: actual knowledge of the
defect and deliberate disregard of the consequences of the defect).
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V. HIDDEN AGENDAS
A. The Punitive Damages Threat

Punitive damages may be the hidden agenda or threat lurking in
Lloyd. Generally, such damages are unavailable in contract actions,
but are allowed for tort claims. 99 Punitive damages are awarded
infrequently - usually in response to outrageous or wanton conduct. IOO
Moreover, they are subject to post-trial reduction. 101 Nevertheless,
defense lawyers claim that the availability of Runitive damages has a
"shadow effect" on litigation and settlement. 02 Clearly, no lawyer
wants to be in the unenviable position of explaining to the client that
the unexpected has happened: an award of significant, even financially
ruinous, punitive damages. 103
In Maryland, a jury may properly award punitive damages only if
the defendant's conduct exhibits "actual malice.,,104 In other words,
99

100

101

102

103

104

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1978) (makes punitive damages available in
contracts cases only if the breach of contract conduct is also a tort permitting
punitive damages.)
See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights
and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 159 (2002) ("Archival
research examining overall patterns of awards find that punitive damages are
infrequently awarded, moderate in size, awarded in response to outrageous
conduct, and often reduced post-trial."); see also Stephen Daniels & Joanne
Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1,31 (1990)
(punitive damages awarded in 8.8 percent of all cases won by plaintiff); Brian l
Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the i990 's,
79 JUDICATURE 233, 238-39 (1996) (punitive damages awarded in 4 percent of
all cases won by plaintiff).
See, e.g., Bullock v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, reh 'g
denied, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), remanded for
reconsideration, 159 P.3d 33 (Cal. 2007) (reducing a twenty-eight billion dollar
award to twenty-eight million dollars).
Id. Nevertheless, some Justices of the United States Supreme Court raised
concerns that punitive damages awards were increasing in number and amount.
See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282
(1989) (O'Connor, l, dissenting).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979); see also Anthony l
Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: Due
Process Revisted After State Farm, 6 U. PA. l CONST. L. 423 (2004); Michael
L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
1297 (2005).
See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460, 601 A.2d 633, 652
(1992).
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the defendant must be motivated by evil intent or the intent to do
harm, knowing that his actions will be harmful. 105 Moreover, a
plaintiff must prove "actual malice" by the heightened "clear and
convincing" evidentiary standard, rather than the customary civil
litigation standard of "preponderance of the evidence.,,106 Thus,
Maryland permits the jury to award punitive damages only in the rare
instance when the jury determines the defendant must be punished for
a bad faith decision. l07 In addition to the punishment motive, punitive
damages seek to deter potential defendants from e.ngaging in similar
conduct. l08 By limiting such disciplinary damages, Maryland achieves
the dual goals of punitive damages -- punishing this defendant, and
deterring similar conduct by future bad actors. 109
Prior to 1992, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had permitted the
award of punitive damages for conduct demonstrating implied
malice. llo However, current Maryland law provides that the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant demonstrated actual malice. 11 I
Moreover, defendants in products liability cases must have "actual
knowledge" of a particular defect and must demonstrate deliberate or
conscious disregard of the foreseeable harm resulting from that
product defect. 112 In 1995, the Court of Appeals of Maryland made
the "actual malice" requirement applicable to intentional and nonintentional tortS. 113 Since 2004, Maryland has held that the clear and
convincing standard applies to the burden of production as well as to
the burden of persuasion. I 14

B. Class Action Issues
Some commentators have suggested that Lloyd will increase the
potential for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring more class actions in

105
106
\07
\08
\09

110

III
112

113
114

Id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652.
Id. at 469,601 A.2d at 657.
Id. at 463,601 A.2d at 654.
Id. at 454,601 A.2d at 650.
Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 733-34, 664 A.2d 916, 932 (1995)
(quoting Zenobia, 325 Md. at 454, 601 A.2d at 650).
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 168,297 A.2d 721, 731 (1972).
Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460,601 A.2d at 652.
Id. at 463,601 A.2d at 654.
Wilson, 339 Md. at 733, 664 A.2d at 932.
Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249,270,841 A.2d
828,840-41 (2004).
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Maryland.
This may be problematic in that class actions have been
the subject of significant controversy.116 For example, Judge Richard
Posner has charged that businesses might settle unmeritorious suits to
avoid the possibility of high judgments, stating, "certification of a
class action, even one lacking in merit, forces defendants 'to stake
their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by
fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal
Moreover, plaintiffs often recover little while their
liability. ",117
attorneys receive excessive fees. 118
In response to such criticism, Congress enacted the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAF A"). 119 CAFA was intended to amend
interstate class actions "to assure fairer outcomes for class members
and defendants.,,12o One of the desired "fairer outcomes" was to keep
plaintiffs' attorneys from manipulating the system. 121 In particular,
the Senate report found "that one reason for the dramatic explosion of
class actions in state courts is that some state court judges are less
careful than their federal court counterparts about applying the
procedural requirements that govern class actions.,,122 Nevertheless,
opponents of CAFA argue that class actions provide a valuable
Moreover, CAFA
deterrent for negative business practices. 123
opponents view class action abuses as minor, isolated, and easily
remedied. 124
115

116

117

118
119

120
121

122
123
124

See Brian A. Zemil, Maryland Expands Products Liability for Unmanifested
Defects, 32 LITIG. NEWS, NO.5, July 2007, at 5 (quoting John B. Isbister as
saying, "plaintiffs' counsel may now believe that Maryland is more favorable
for filing class actions based on unmanifested defect claims"). However, Scott
L. Nelson argues that, "non-Maryland plaintiffs who try to file a class action in
Maryland state court likely will end up in federal court under the Class Action
Fairness Act, and the courts would be unlikely to apply Maryland law to claims
by out-of-state plaintiffs against out-of-state defendants anyway." Id.
See, e.g., Lesley Frieder Wolf, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class
Certification After Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1847 (2000).
Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Tort Reform Past, Present
and Future: Solving Old Problems and Dealing with "New Style" Litigation, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 237, 263 (2000) (quoting In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,1299 (7th Cir. 1995».
/d. at 260; In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d at 1293, 1299.
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified
as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1711 et seq. (2000».
Id.
S. REp. No. 109-14, at 5-6 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.
See id. at 14, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 14.
Cf id. at 83, as reprinted in 2005 V.S.C.C.A.N., at 76 (minority views).
Id. at 83, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 76 (minority views).
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Some su~gest that CAF A might not eliminate the current perceived
problems. 12 For example, plaintiffs will likely limit class actions to
state-only classes, rather than one massive national class action,
126
Additionally,
thereby allowing state courts to retain jurisdiction.
although in many situations bargaining power would shift to the
defendant, plaintiffs' lawyers bringing multiple state-by-state class
actions will retain significant power in negotiating with potential
defendants. 127
VI. THE COLLISION OF TORT AND CONTRACT
As early as 1966, Marc Franklin predicted that the products liability
system would suffer a collision between strict liability in tort and
contractual warranty theories -- especially the implied warranty of
merchantability.128 American legal jurisprudence continues to struggle
with delineating the proper roles of tort and contract. 129 The economic
loss rule is merely one aspect of this struggle. 130 Unfortunately, Lloyd
fails to improve the situation. Rather, it adds confusion and lack of
predictability to Maryland products liability law.
The United States Supreme Court considered the appropriate roles
of tort and contract in economic loss cases in East River Steamship
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.l3l As previously discussed, the
Court held that, "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no
duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to
prevent a product from injuring itself.,,132 The Court reasoned that,
"when a product injures only itself, the reasons for imposing a tort
125

126
127
128

129

130
131

132

Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year Saga is
Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 385, 386 (2005); see generally OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 272-73 ("In a new form of class
action litigation, courts in recent years have been asked to allow recovery for the
reduction in value of a product because it contains a dangerous condition, such
as a particular type of tire likely to blowout or SUV likely to roll over. The
courts have been singularly unreceptive to these 'no-injury' claims.").
Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
80 TuL. L. REv. 1593, 1608 (2006).
Cf id.
Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in
Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 974, 990-1016 (1966).
See, e.g., James J. White, Reverberations from the Collision of Tort and
Warranty, 53 s.c. L. REV. 1067 (2002).
See id. at 1067-68.
476 U.S. 858 (1986).
Id. at 871; see also supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
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duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual
remedies are strong.,,133 Moreover, the Court emphasized the
importance of maintaining the distinction between tort and contract. 134
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court stressed that tort
doctrine is concerned primarily with safety, while contract law seeks
to protect society's interest in enforcing promises. 135 Therefore, if the
only damage is to the product itself, societal tort concerns with safety
are diminished. 136 Significantly, the Court stressed that, "[t]he
increased cost to the public that would result from holding a
manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not
justified.,,137 Moreover, the Court underscored that pure economic
loss in terms of damage to the product itself is the province of
warranty law -- the arena best-suited to protect reasonable buyer
expectations. 138 The East River Court noted that, "maintenance of
product value and ?uality is precisely the purpose of express and
implied warranties." 39 Fundamentally, East River demonstrates that
cases involving products causing economic harm by failing to meet
reasonable buyer expectations simply deny the buyer the benefit of the
bargain. 140 Therefore, these cases present a basic contract issue, not a
tort concern. 141
In East River, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
underlying the economic loss doctrine is the contractual parties'
freedom of contract. Specifically, parties must be permitted to allocate
economic loss by contract. 142 Since contracting parties can set the
terms of their agreements, the economic loss doctrine encourages the
party best situated to assume or insure against a particular risk to
negotiate an appropriate contract term. 143 Moreover, product sellers
can limit their contractual liability by disclaiming warranties or

133
134
135

136
137

138
139
140
141

142
143

E. River, 476 U.S. at 871.
Id.
Id. at 871-72.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 872.
Id.
See E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-73.
Id.
See id. at 873 n.8; see also Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 152 (Cal.
1965) (holding that the doctrine of strict liability in tort governs the distinct
problem of physical injuries and does not undermine warranty law).
E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-73.
See id.
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limiting damages. 144 Underscoring the core differences between
contract and tort, especially as applied to products liability, the Court
stressed that, in the products arena, "where there is a duty to the public
generally, foreseeability is an inadequate brake.,,14s Ultimately, the
Court worried that permitting recovery for pure economic loss "could
make a manufacturer liable for vast sumS.,,146 By contrast, the Court
recognized that warranty law places legitimate and reasonable
limitations on seller liability.147 At bottom, the economic loss doctrine
is required to prevent product sellers from facing unknowable,
unlimited damages.
VII. PRODUCTS LIABILITY POLICY

r

An underlyin policy of products liability law is encouraging
product safety.14 However, unlike "product safety" law, which is
largely regulatory,149 products liability law operates after the fact; that
is, after product damage has occurred, providing a private litigation
response for product accidents. ISO Professor David Owen argues that:

Products liability law lies at the center of the modem
world. To a large extent, persons accomplish their
individual and collective objectives, and relate to one
another, through the products of technology . . . .
Products liability law instead concerns the consequences
of modem science and technology gone awry-when
products, or the interactions between persons and their
products, fail. I S I
Professor Owen maintains that products liability has moral
foundations at its core. IS2 These moral issues arise because the
relationship between product seller and product accident victim

144

145
146
147
148

149
150
151
152

Id. at 873 (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-316,2-719 (1977)).
!d. at 874.
Id.
Id.
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 1; see also, FRANK 1.
VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY 20-21 (1989).
Owen, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 2.
!d. at 3.
Id. at 6-7.
Id.; see generally David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability
Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 429-30 (1993)
(hereinafter "Owen, Moral Foundations").
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"implicates fundamental issues of moral philosophy.,,153 Owen asserts
that when manufacturers make product safety decisions, they make
choices about safety and personal autonomy, which may rightfully
belong to product users.154 At the same time, by making risky use of
products or making claims against product sellers, product users may
"appropriate to themselves economic interests that may belong to
manufacturers and other consumers.,,155
Significantly, this approach recognizes that the product ~roducer
and the product consumer have reciprocal safety obligations. 1 6 At the
very least, the product accident victim must demonstrate that the
product defect was the cause-in-fact of his harm.157 Maryland law
generally requires the plaintiff to prove that it is more likely than not
that the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor" in creating the
plaintiffs IOSS.158 Clearly, Maryland courts have been traditional in
their view of causation in products liability law. For example, federal
courts have recognized that Maryland courts are unlikely to innovate
in this arena by refusing to apply market share liability to products
They also recognize that tort liability for
liability cases. 159
unmanifested product defects is as radical a departure from products
liability as adoption of market share. 16o Moreover, Lloyd's rejection of
traditional concepts of proof of product defect is equally problematic.
Maryland products liability law has always required the plaintiff to
prove: (1) that the product was in a defective condition when it left
153

OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 7.

154

Id.

155

!d.
See. e.g., Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability
and the Demise o/the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L.
REv. 227, 236 (1997); see generally David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L.
REv. 703 (1992).
See e.g., Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 777, 779 (Tex. 1995)
(Cornyn, J., concurring).
Pittman V. Atl. Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 521 n.4, 754 A.2d 1030, 1034 nA
(2000).
See McClelland V. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 735 F. Supp. 172, 174 (D. Md.
1990) (noting that Maryland has not adopted the market share theory and
therefore rejecting the theory because it failed to satisfy the traditional products
liability requirement of proximate causation); see also TidIer V. Eli Lilly & Co.,
95 F.R.D. 332, 335 (D. D.C. 1982) (noting that federal judges in Maryland have
rejected the theory and expressing doubt as to whether D.C. courts would adopt
it).
Tidier, 95 F.R.D. at 335 (calling market share a "radical departure from the
traditional concepts of product liability law").

156

157

158

159

160
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the seller; (2) that the seller caused the defect; and (3) that the product
defect proximately caused the plaintiffs 10SS.161
It is all the more puzzling that the Court of Appeals of Maryland
would abandon these basic products liability tort principles in a case,
such as Lloyd, which provides adequate contractual and consumer
protection remedies. 162 Simply put, there was absolutely no reason for
the court to "innovate," by abandoning basic, established tort
principles in a case easily solved by contract law. 163 The court, itself,
recognized that the Lloyd plaintiffs were adequately protected by
warranty and consumer law. 164

The Court of Appeals of Maryland ignored the issue of moral
responsibility. 165
Tort liability should encourage product
manufacturers to create safer products. 166 However, these legitimate
results are more likely to occur when product sellers ray the actual
costs of product accident losses -- no more and no less. 1 7 Admittedly,
the injured user must necessarily pay product accident costs that the
seller does not pay.168 Ultimately, consumers as a whole bear the cost
of these product accidents in the loss-spreading price increase passed
on to them by the sellers. 169 Therefore, the market price of products
should reflect the actual cost of those products, including accident
costs. 170 Ignoring legitimate torts concerns of proof of defect and
causation may, in fact, provide an inefficient and even immoral result.
161

162
163
164
165

166

167

168
169
170

Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110,121,422 A.2d 16,23 (1980); see
also Lloyd v. Gen Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108,134,916 A.2d 257, 272 (2007)
(citing Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958
(1976»; see generally David A. Fischer, Products Liability -- The Meaning of
Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974).
Lloyd, 397 Md. at 157-71,916 A.2d at 285-94.
Id. at 164-71, 916 A.2d at 289-94.
Id. at 164-66,916 A.2d at 289-91.
See generally Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 152 and accompanying
text.
See generally John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 MISS. LJ. 825, 826 (1973) ("[I]f a manufacturer knows he will be
held liable for injuries inflicted by his product, that product will be safer.");
David G. Owen, Musings on Modern Products Liability Law: A Foreword, 17
SETON HALL L. REv. 505 (1987).
See, Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 376 (1965).
See id. at 376.
Id. at 365-66.
See, e.g., David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND.
L. REv. 681 (1980).
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As previously discussed, most states apply the economic loss
rule. l7l Under this rule, tort law refuses to compensate for pure
economic or financial losses independent of any physical harm. l72
Both the economic loss rule, and decisions recognizing the
significance of the doctrinal distinctions between tort and contract,
implicate important policy considerations. 173 One policy encourages
loss spreading by placing the loss on the party best able to spread it to
the entire consuming public through insurance or product cost
174
·
ad~ustments.
Significantly, another policy favoring the economic loss rule comes
from the law and economics literature. 175 Basically, this policy
distinguishes between the types of tort harm. 176 The first type of harm
results in a net social loss, where a physical harm to the plaintiff does
not result in an economic benefit to another. I77 As the loss is not
balanced by a similar gain, there is a net 10SS.178 Therefore, the effect
of this tort harm is felt beyond the immediate parties. 179 Recovery in
these cases is supported by the fundamental policy of corrective
justice: the tortfeasor should pay the loss, not the tort victim. 180
On the other hand, some harms are different because they simply
shift economic activity -- one party's economic loss is another's
171

172
173

174

175

176

177
178
179
180

See supra section III.
See supra section III.
See supra notes 37-58; see also Miller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574
(7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]ort law is a superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely
commercial disputes. We have a body of law designed for such disputes. It is
called contract law. Products liability law has evolved into a specialized branch
of tort law for use in cases in which a defective product caused, not the usual
commercial loss, but a personal injury to a consumer or bystander.").
See, e.g., Page Keeton, Products Liability -- The Nature and Extent of Strict
Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693, 695 ("The principal reason that has now gained
undisputed acceptance for shifting losses from users and consumers to
manufacturers is the capacity of those engaged in the manufacturing enterprise
to distribute the losses of the few to the many who purchase the products.").
See generally Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort:
Another Look at Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1991); W.
Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort,2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Mario J.
Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281
(1982).
See David Gruning, Pure Economic Loss in American Tort Law: An Unstable
Consensus, 54 AM. J. COMPo L. (SUPPLEMENT) 187,206-08 (2006).

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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economic gain. 181 As a result, the victim's harm does not result in a
net social loss. For example, when a party's business is disrupted by
market innovations or new competition, the party will view the
disruption as a loss. However, the result for other ~roducers and for
commerce is. the opposite -- they experience a gain. 18
Misapplying the economic loss doctrine can add to the problem of
inconsistent verdicts in the products liability arena. I83 Most scholars
now agree that negligence and strict liability in tort, product design,
and warning cases are basically equivalent actions. 18 Nevertheless,
for practical reasons, plaintiffs' lawyers may prefer negligence
claims. 185 Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that juries are more
favorable to negligence than strict liability claims 186. The closeness of
the two theories, however, may result in inconsistent verdicts. For
example, if a jury decides for the plaintiff on the negligence claim, but
for the defendant on the strict liability claim, the verdicts may be
logically inconsistent since both claims require the product be
"defective." As a result, the two findings -- the product is not
defective, but the defendant was negligent in producing or selling it -are contradictory. They cannot be reconciled or harmonized in any
meaningful way.I87 Therefore, most courts have correctly reasoned
181
182
183

184

185

186

187

See id.
See id.
The Restatement (Third) also takes the position that a plaintiff should not be
permitted to present two "factually identical" defect claims to the jury because
of the possibility for juror confusion, resulting in "inconsistent verdicts."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998).
See generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict
Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 874 (2002).
Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer,
2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521, 531-32 (1974).
Cupp & Polage, supra note 184, at 936-37 (noting that in mock trials, twentysix percent of jurors hearing strict liability language awarded damages versus
thirty-eight percent of jurors hearing negligence language; strict liability juror
awards averaged $27,571 in pain and suffering awards versus $49,750 by
negligence jurors).
See, e.g., Halvorson v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 240 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn.
1976) ("If a product is not ... defective ... it is not negligence to manufacture it
that way."), abrogated on other grounds by Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324
N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982); Hood v. Ryobi N. Am., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450
(D. Md. 1998), afJ'd, 181 F.3d 608 n.l (4th Cir. 1999); Higginbotham v. KCS
Int'l, Inc., 85 F. App'x. 911, 917 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying Maryland law)
(stating that "the elements of proof are the same whether the claim be for strict
liability or negligence" so that plaintiffs failure to establish defect and
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that a negligence finding is inconsistent with a finding that a product is
not defective. 188
Similarly, the fundamental identity between the concept of
defectiveness under strict iiability in tort,189 and unmerchantability
under the Uniform Commercial Code,190 has also led to inconsistent
and unsupportable verdicts. 191 Simply put, the finder of fact should
product is not
not be permitted to conclude inconsistently that
defective in a strict liability sense, yet breaches the implied warranty
of merchantability.192 The majority of jurisdictions, 193 and the
American Law Institute support this view. 194

a

For similar policy reasons, the clear majority of courts have
supported the economic loss rule, refusing to permit recovery for pure
economic 10SS.195 These well-considered policies also explain the fact
that the majority of courts "have been singularly unreceptive to these
'no-injury' claims.,,196 Basically, these no-injury cases are identical to
the Lloyd unmanifested defect claims. Maryland products liability law
would have been better served had the Lloyd decision honored earlier
precedent and the views of the majority of commentators and courts
concerning the appropriate roles of tort and contract.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A MODEST PROPOSAL
In cases in which the defective product causes physical harm in the
sense of damage for bodily injury or damage to other tangible
property, tort law provides significant monetary remedies. The injured
party can recover compensatory damages for bodily injury, pain and
suffering, Froperty damage, and economic loss caused by the defective
product. 19

195

causation caused all their negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability
claims to fail).
See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 322-23 & n.33.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
V.C.c. § 2-314 (2007).
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 327; see also Denny v.
Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).
See, e.g., White, supra note 129, at 1072-75.
See Peter J. Ausili, Ramifications of Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 15 TOURO. L.
REv. 735, 744 & n.49 (1998).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998); V.C.C. § 2314 cmt. 7 (amended 2007).
See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 273 & n.84.

196

[d.

197

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1977).

188
189
190
191

192
193

194
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A different rule applies, however, if the product purchaser only
suffers economic loss consisting of damage to the product itself with
resulting financial loss, such as diminution in product value, reduced
profits or repair costs. In the majority of jurisdictions, the product
seller sued in tort is not liable for these pure economic damages under
the economic loss rule. 198
In the products liability arena, the economic loss rule has been
subject to debate. 199 This debate focuses on the restrictive roles of tort
and contract law?OO As previously noted, the United States Supreme
Court views pure economic loss in the products liability arena in
contract terms, "essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the
benefit of its bargain - traditionally the core concern of contract
law.,,201
To avoid the uncertainty and inconsistency created by Lloyd,
Maryland should adopt section 21 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability. Adoption of section 21 would clarify two areas: 1)
adoption of the economic loss doctrine; and 2) adoption of the rule
requiring disappointed consumers who suffer financial loss only to sue
in contract, rather than permitting actions in both warranty and tort.
Section 21 of the Products Liability Restatement provides for recovery
of economic loss only "if caused by harm to: a) the plaintiffs person;
or b) the person of another [in whom plaintiff has an interest;] or c) the
plaintiffs property other than the defective product itself.,,202
Adopting section 21 would place Maryland with the majority of
jurisdictions, prohibiting recovery in tort of pure economic losses,
independent of damage to person or other property.
Just as
significantly, it places Maryland law in the appropriate doctrinal
position of separating contract and tort, by insisting that actual
physical injury must occur before tort claims exist. Finally, rejecting
claims for unmanifested defects ensures basic fairness. Providing tort
compensation only after injury occurs ensures that the extent of the
injury and the identity of the injured parties is more than speculative.
198

199
200

201

202

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d & reporter's note
cmt. d. (1998).
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY ~ 27.01 (3d ed. 1994).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. d
(Proposed Final Draft No.1, 2005).
E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870
(1986); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d
(1998).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998).
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Although the Lloyd approach would be rejected, the A.J Decoster Co.
case, permitting recovery in tort for damage to property other than the
product itself, could be retained. 203 At the same time, adoption of
section 21 would place Maryland with the majority of courts, as well
as the V.C.C., which include repair and replacement costs under
contract law. 204 It would return Maryland to the path first taken in
PhippS 205 - the path which respects the appropriate differences between
contract and tort, the path which best serves Maryland products
liability law development.

203

204
205

A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 259, 634 A.2d
1330, 1337 (1994).
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 crnt. d (1998).
See Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).

